On the construction of social preferences in lab experiments by Borgloh, Sarah et al.
Dis cus si on Paper No. 10-085
On the Construction of 
Social Preferences in Lab Experiments
Sarah Borgloh, Astrid Dannenberg, 
and Bodo Aretz
Dis cus si on Paper No. 10-085
On the Construction of 
Social Preferences in Lab Experiments
Sarah Borgloh, Astrid Dannenberg, 
and Bodo Aretz
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von 
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung 
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other 
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly 
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10085.pdf
Non-technical summary 
One of the most important questions in experimental economics is whether individual 
behavior in certain games is predictive for behavior in other games or contexts. Critics often 
claim that individual behavior in the lab is limited to that situation and does not contain much 
information about how people behave outside the lab. This question appears to be particularly 
relevant for ‘other-regarding’ or social preferences, i.e. preferences which are not captured by 
the standard assumption of purely payoff-maximizing agents and which have been largely 
investigated in the lab. The results of the experiments testing the stability of other-regarding 
preferences across multiple games or multiple contexts are ambiguous. The ambiguity may be 
partly explained by the ‘constructive-preference’ approach, which suggests that individuals 
construct preferences spontaneously when they are confronted with an unfamiliar decision 
situation. With more experience in a certain situation, preferences consolidate over time and 
become more stable. 
This paper sheds light on this issue by investigating and comparing charitable donations and 
dictator game allocations in an experimental setting for a better understanding of what drives 
the decision in each task and whether behavior in one task is predictive of behavior in the 
other. The donation decision is a familiar decision situation where individuals are likely to 
have existing preferences. In contrast, the dictator game, though very simple, represents a 
rather unfamiliar decision situation where subjects may construct their preferences ad hoc. In 
the experiment, we pay special attention to the sequence in which the games are played. 
Our experimental results show a significantly positive correlation between both decision tasks 
if (and only if) the more familiar donation decision is presented first and the rather unfamiliar 
dictator game is played thereafter. Moreover, the dictator game allocations depend on the 
sequence of games while the charitable donations do not. Hence, social preferences elicited in 
the donation context are predictive of subsequent behavior in the dictator game but not vice 
versa. Thus, if experimenters try to elicit social preferences to make predictions about 
behavior in other contexts, it seems reasonable to confront individuals with more familiar 
decision situations where preferences exist and do not need to be constructed. Furthermore, 
special attention should be paid to the sequence of games if they present a new decision 
situation for the experimental subjects. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Eine der wichtigsten Fragen in der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung ist, ob das 
Verhalten der Versuchspersonen in einem Spiel Vorhersagen für das Verhalten in anderen 
Spielen oder in anderen Kontexten erlaubt. Kritiker argumentieren häufig, dass das Verhalten 
der Versuchspersonen den Laborbedingungen geschuldet ist und kaum Rückschlüsse auf ihr 
Verhalten außerhalb des Labors zulässt. Diese Frage ist insbesondere relevant für 
Verhaltensmuster, die sich nicht mit der Standardannahme des ‚homo oeconomicus‘, sondern 
mit sozialen Präferenzen begründen lassen, da diese Verhaltensmuster oft im Labor 
untersucht werden. Die Experimente, die sich mit der Stabilität von sozialen Präferenzen über 
verschiedene Spiele und Kontexte beschäftigen, kommen zu keinem eindeutigen Ergebnis. 
Die fehlende Eindeutigkeit kann teilweise mit dem Ansatz der ‚konstruierten Präferenzen‘ 
erklärt werden. Dieser geht davon aus, dass Personen, die mit einer ungewohnten 
Entscheidungssituation konfrontiert werden, über keine existierenden Präferenzen verfügen, 
sondern diese spontan konstruieren. Mit zunehmender Erfahrung verfestigen sich die 
Präferenzen und werden stabiler. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit diesen Fragen, indem sie Spendenentscheidungen 
und Entscheidungen in einem konventionellen Diktatorspiel im Rahmen eines Experiments 
vergleicht. Dabei stellt die Spendenentscheidung eine bekannte Entscheidungssituation dar, in 
der die Versuchspersonen über existierende Präferenzen verfügen. Das Diktatorspiel dagegen 
stellt eine ungewohnte Situation dar, in der die Versuchspersonen ihre Präferenzen vermutlich 
eher ad hoc konstruieren. Besonderes Augenmerk liegt auf der Reihenfolge der beiden 
Entscheidungen.  
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen eine signifikant positive Korrelation zwischen beiden 
Entscheidungen, sofern die Spendenentscheidung vor der Diktatorspielentscheidung 
präsentiert wird. Während das Verhalten im Diktatorspiel von der Reihenfolge der beiden 
Entscheidungen abhängt, ist das Spendenverhalten unabhängig von der Reihenfolge. Das 
heißt, die Spendenentscheidung hat Erklärungskraft für die nachfolgende Entscheidung im 
Diktatorspiel, aber nicht umgekehrt. Wir schließen daraus, dass Entscheidungen in bekannten 
Situationen besser geeignet sind, um Aussagen über individuelle soziale Präferenzen 
abzuleiten. Darüber hinaus sollte der Reihenfolge der Spiele in einem Experiment besondere 
Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt werden, wenn die Spiele die Versuchspersonen vor eine neue 
Entscheidungssituation stellen. 
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Abstract: 
This paper studies the construction of social preferences in the lab. Experimental subjects 
have the opportunity to donate to a charity and to allocate money in a conventional dictator 
game. The results show that charitable donations and dictator game allocations are positively 
correlated. The correlation is only significant, however, if the dictator game follows the 
donation decision. Furthermore, while donation behavior is independent from the order of 
play, dictator game behavior is not. In line with the constructive-preference approach, we 
argue that preferences are instable and sensitive to outside influences when subjects are 
confronted with a new decision situation, while in a well-known situation preferences are 
more stable. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the most important questions in experimental economics is whether subjects’ behavior 
in certain games is predictive for behavior in other games or contexts. Critics often claim that 
individual behavior in the lab is limited to that situation and does not contain much 
information about how people behave outside the lab. This question appears to be particularly 
relevant for ‘other-regarding’ or social preferences, i.e. preferences which are not captured by 
the standard assumption of purely payoff-maximizing agents and which have been largely 
investigated in the lab. 
One important class of theories which has been developed to explain other-regarding behavior 
sticks to the assumption of rational agents but introduces an additional motive to the utility 
function. This set of theories includes, among others, the ‘warm-glow’ of giving (Andreoni, 
1989, 1990), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and the 
desire to comply with social norms (Levitt and List, 2007). In order to test the various theories 
of social preferences in the lab, experimental economists have developed a wide range of 
games, like for example the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the trust game or the public 
good game. It has been shown that a substantial share of experimental subjects does not act 
selfishly, but shares their endowment, rewards pro-social behavior and contributes to public 
goods. Still, the results of the experiments testing the stability of social preferences across 
multiple games or multiple contexts are ambiguous (see Bolton et al., 2008 and the next 
section for examples).  
The discussion about whether preferences are stable or not goes back to Stigler and Becker 
(1977), who propose that tastes are stable over time and similar among people. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981), in comparison, emphasize the importance of framing effects for shifts in 
individual preferences. There is also some empirical evidence that in certain situations 
preferences are constructed rather than existing. The constructive-preference approach 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006) suggests that individuals construct preferences when they are 
confronted with an unfamiliar decision situation. Thus, the nature of the task, the information 
available and the situational context have a strong impact on preference construction. With 
more experience in a certain situation, preferences are said to consolidate over time and 
become more stable (Hoeffler and Ariely, 1999). 
This paper sheds light on this issue by investigating and comparing charitable donations and 
dictator game allocations in an experimental setting for a better understanding of what drives 
the decision in each task and whether behavior in one task is predictive of behavior in the 
 1 
other. The donation decision is a familiar decision situation where individuals are likely to 
have existing preferences. In contrast, the dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986), though very 
simple, represents a rather unfamiliar decision situation for most subjects: it is hard to imagine 
real-life situations where one is asked to share a certain amount of money with a completely 
anonymous person. Therefore, it seems questionable that individuals have a well-defined set 
of existing preferences guiding their behavior in this game. Individuals faced with this game 
might rather construct their preferences ad hoc. Moreover, the dictator game has been shown 
to be relatively sensitive towards changes in the experimental setting: Methodological 
variables, such as anonymity and experimenter blindness, as well as structural variables, such 
as identity of recipients, communication, available action sets, entitlement to and information 
about the amount being divided, can have strong effects on the outcome (for an overview see 
Camerer, 2003, List, 2007). 
Unlike many of the previous experiments, we use within-subject as well as between-subject 
tests and we pay special attention to the sequence in which the games are played as it plays a 
role, if preferences are indeed constructed and therefore instable. Furthermore, we use a non-
student subject pool for two reasons: first, those subjects are unlikely to have played a dictator 
game before. And second, supposedly all of them have either donated to a charity or at least 
been asked for donations before. Our experimental results show that there is a significantly 
positive correlation between both decision tasks if - and only if - the more familiar donation 
decision is presented first and the rather unfamiliar dictator game is played thereafter. 
Moreover, the dictator game allocations depend on the sequence of games while the charitable 
donations do not. Hence, social preferences elicited in the donation context are predictive of 
subsequent behavior in the dictator game but not vice versa. Thus, if experimenters try to 
elicit social preferences to make predictions about behavior in other contexts, it seems 
reasonable to confront individuals with more familiar decision situations where preferences 
exist and do not need to be constructed. Furthermore, special attention should be paid to the 
sequence of games if they present a new decision situation for the experimental subjects. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: the second part presents empirical findings from related 
studies. Part three describes the experimental setting and the fourth part delivers the results. 
The last part concludes. 
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2 Empirical Findings 
Looking at the findings from earlier empirical work, the question whether social preferences 
measured in lab experiments, and particularly in dictator games, are predictive of behavior in 
other games or other contexts, is still largely unanswered. There are three different types of 
studies which are related to our approach: 
First, several lab experiments use (modified) dictator games to measure individual social 
preferences and relate the observed behavior to the performance in a different game by means 
of within-subject tests (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2006, Blanco et al., 2008, Brosig et al., 2007, 
Teyssier, 2009). The experimental results are not coherent, thereby indicating that dictator 
game behavior is not reliably predictive of behavior in other games. All the listed studies use 
context-free games and test theories of other-regarding behavior. 
The second branch of literature deals with the consequences of context for decision making 
within economic experiments. These studies aim at comparing dictator game allocations with 
charitable donations (e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 1996, Bettinger and Slonim, 2006). They 
generally find that people give more to charities than to peers in a dictator game. Similarly, 
Brañas-Garza (2006) shows that dictators are more generous if they are informed that their 
recipients are poor compared with the behavior if not provided with this information. This 
branch seems to have the greatest similarity to our approach; however, they do not consider 
the correlation between games, i.e. whether the people who are generous in the dictator game 
are more likely to donate to charities.  
The third class of studies does consider the correlation between games but focuses on social 
dilemma games rather than dictator games. More precisely, the studies compare behavior in 
context-free social dilemma games with contributions to naturally occurring public goods 
using within-subject tests (e.g. Laury and Taylor, 2008, Oliveira et al., 2008). The 
experimental results indicate that cooperative behavior across multiple contexts tends to be 
stable, albeit the relation is not always incontrovertible.1 
The focus of all studies mentioned above lies on the comparison of behavior across multiple 
games or multiple contexts, so the effects of sequence are of minor interest. Although some of 
the studies control for sequence effects by changing the order of the games, and some of these 
indeed find effects, none of them really dwell on those effects. Our study narrows this gap as 
subjects have to make both charitable donation decisions and decisions in a conventional 
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dictator game. In doing so, we changed the order of play to examine whether or not 
preferences are robust to this modification, which may indicate whether they are existing or 
constructed. 
 
3 Experimental Design 
Participants and Implementation 
For subject recruitment, invitation letters were randomly distributed in the city of Mannheim, 
Germany. The letter contained an invitation to take part in a scientific study and informed 
people that they would receive €40 for participation. It was announced that there would be a 
survey in which they could (voluntarily and anonymously) make consumption decisions. We 
used this relatively high show-up fee in order to avoid underrepresentation of people with 
high opportunity costs of time. The experiment took place in July 2009 on the premises of the 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim with a total of 223 
participants. At the beginning of each session, participants individually drew lots to determine 
their ID number - which remained unknown to other participants and the experimenters - and 
chose a table. The tables had privacy screens on every side to ensure private decisions and 
answers. Participants were not allowed to talk to each other. If they had questions, the 
experimenters answered them privately. The 12 experimental sessions lasted around 60 
minutes each. Within one session, all subjects performed exactly the same task. At first, all 
participants obtained detailed instructions about the course of the experiment.2 The main 
features were orally repeated. We emphasized that any information given in the instructions 
was true. Participants in all treatments filled out a questionnaire about socio-demographic 
characteristics and donation habits. At the end of each session, participants also had the 
chance to comment on the experiment and give reasons for their decisions. 
Participants’ socio-demographic characteristics and donation habits are shown in the appendix 
(Tables A1 and A2). Although the subject pool is not fully representative of the German 
resident population, it is sufficiently diversified in all socio-demographic variables in order to 
examine the influence of each variable on charitable donations and dictator game allocations. 
Moreover, in case of gender, income and religion the distribution of our subject pool does not 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 A fourth branch of literature tests whether individual other-regarding behavior in the lab and in the field 
correlates (e.g. Benz and Meier, 2008, Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008, Carpenter and Myers, 2010), which is often 
the case. 
2 See appendix for experimental instructions. 
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significantly differ from that of the German population (chi squared test, t-test, p>0.1).3 More 
precisely, 46.2% of subjects are male; 22.9% dispose of a monthly net household income of 
less than €1,000; most of the subjects live in households with incomes between €1,000 and 
€3,000; and 13.0% have more than €3,000 per month disposable. With regard to religion, 
Catholics (31.4%) and Protestants (31.8%) are equally represented, whereas 6.7% are 
affiliated with a different religious group and 30.0% of all subjects do not belong to any 
religious community. The vast majority of participants (84.8%) had previously donated to a 
charity. The most common charitable purposes were child care and disabled care followed by 
development aid and environment or animal protection. This underlines that most 
experimental subjects show some kind of experience regarding the donation decision. 
 
Treatments 
The experiment comprised three treatments. Each treatment contained a real donation stage 
where subjects simultaneously and independently decided how much - if any - of their 
endowment they want to donate to a certain charity. All of the selected charities have obtained 
the ‘DZI Spendensiegel’, a label for charities which use their funds economically and 
according to their statutes.4 Subjects could choose one of four charitable purposes, namely 
disabled care, development aid, medical research or animal protection and they only knew the 
purpose but not the name of the organizations.5 All donation decisions were completely 
voluntary and anonymous. We used a double blind procedure in which neither other subjects 
nor experimenters came to know if, how much and to which purpose a subject donated. 
Subjects received a large envelope containing two smaller envelopes and the endowment of 
€40 broken into two 10-euro notes, one 5-euro note, six 2-euro coins and three 1-euro coins. 
This breakdown enabled subjects to donate any integer amount between €0 and €40 and 
reduced incentives to only give the coins. Subjects placed the amount they wished to donate 
in one of the small envelopes assigned to donations, labeled the envelope with their ID 
number and, in case they were willing to give a positive amount, the charitable purpose to 
which they wished to donate. The amount of money subjects wished to keep for themselves 
was placed in the other small envelope. Afterwards, subjects dropped the envelopes specified 
for donations in a box. All donations made during the experiment were transferred in full to 
                                                 
3 Unless stated otherwise, all tests in this paper are two-sided. 
4 For more information (in German language), see www.dzi.de. 
5 Some of the participants also received information about the size of the charities, which is not discussed in this 
paper. As there is no significant difference in donations between subjects who received the information and 
subjects who did not, we felt free to pool the data. For more details, see Borgloh et al. (2010). 
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the respective organizations. The counting of donations and the transfer to the organizations 
were monitored and certified by a notary. This procedure and the name of the notary had  
been announced in the experimental instructions. 
The baseline treatment (“NoDG”) solely involved the donation stage and afterwards the 
completion of the questionnaire. Two treatments contained a conventional dictator game 
besides the donation stage. In those treatments, subjects received an additional endowment of 
€20. Subjects simultaneously and independently decided how much - if any - of this 
endowment they want to give to another participant. Recipients of this allocation were 
randomly selected from the NoDG treatment without dictator game. The procedure in the 
dictator game was the same as in the donation stage. Subjects did not get any information 
about the recipient except that the person participated in a different session and did not 
receive the additional €20. The dictator game decisions were completely voluntary and 
anonymous. We also used a double blind procedure in which neither other subjects nor 
experimenters came to know if and how much a subject allocated to the recipient. Subjects 
received a large envelope containing two smaller envelopes and the endowment of €20 broken 
into two 5-euro notes, two 2-euro coins, and six 1-euro coins. This breakdown enabled 
subjects to donate any integer amount between €0 and €20 and again reduced incentives to 
only give the coins.  
Subjects placed the amount they wished to allocate to the recipient in one of the small 
envelopes and labeled the envelope with their ID number. The amount of money subjects 
wished to keep for themselves was placed in the other small envelope. Afterwards, subjects 
dropped the envelopes with the allocations to the recipients in a box. Subjects knew that these 
envelopes were given to randomly selected recipients even if the envelopes did not contain 
any money. In one dictator game treatment (“DGStart”), the dictator game was placed at the 
start of the session followed by the questionnaire and the donation stage. In the other dictator 
game treatment (“DGEnd”), sessions started with the donation stage, proceeded with the 
questionnaire and ended with the dictator game. Recipients in the treatments without dictator 
game obtained the envelopes with the allocations from the dictators always at the end of the 
session.6 Table 1 summarizes the features of all treatments including number of sessions and 
number of subjects. 
 
                                                 
6 Due to no-shows we had a few more dictators than recipients. The amount of money that these dictators 
allocated to recipients (overall €7) was transferred to a randomly selected charity.  
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Table 1: Treatments 
Treatment No. of charitable 
purposes 
DG Time of 
DG 
No. of 
sessions 
No. of 
subjects 
NoDG 4 no 6 108
DGStart 4 yes    start 2 40
DGEnd 4 yes    end 4 75
Total  12 223
  
 
4 Results 
Average Patterns 
In total, €1,225 are donated to the charities. Broken down by purposes, €448 are donated to 
disabled care, €318 to development aid, €274 to medical research, and €185 to animal 
protection. Disabled care is not only the most frequently (21%) selected purpose but also 
receives the highest average donations (€9.53). While individual donations do not differ 
significantly between the four purposes, subjects select animal protection less frequently than 
the other three purposes (binomial test, 1% significance). On average, €5.49 (14% of the 
initial endowment of €40) are donated to the charities and €4.70 (23% of the initial 
endowment of €20) are allocated in the dictator game. Overall, 33% of the subjects do not 
make a donation and 27% of the subjects do not allocate anything in the dictator game. Table 
2 summarizes the most important descriptive findings.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 No. of observations Average donation 
(in €) 
Average DG allocation 
(in €) 
NoDG 108 5.72 - 
DG 115           5.27    4.70 
 DGStart 40 6.25 6.25 
 DGEnd 75 4.76 3.87 
Total         223          5.49          4.70     
 
In the DGStart treatment, in which the dictator game is played at the beginning of the session, 
dictators allocate an average amount of €6.25. Allocations in the DGEnd treatment, in which 
the dictator game is played at the end of the session, are significantly lower: Here, dictators 
allocate €3.87 on average (Mann Whitney test, 1% significance). Figure 1 illustrates this 
difference: While only 10% of the dictators in DGStart do not allocate anything to an 
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experimental peer, this percentage is much higher in the DGEnd treatment (36%). At the same 
time, the share of dictators who allocate at least €10 is twice as large in DGStart as in DGEnd. 
The average charitable donations made in the different treatments (€5.72 in NoDG, €6.25 in 
DGStart and €4.76 in DGEnd) do not significantly differ. 
Result 1: Absolute dictator game allocations are significantly higher 
when the dictator game is played prior to the donation stage. Absolute 
donations do not significantly differ between treatments. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of dictator game allocations across treatments 
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Why do dictators give less when this decision follows the donation decision? For a start, we 
suggest that an income effect might cause this observation. At the time of the dictator game 
decision, subjects in the DGStart treatment did not know that they would be asked for 
donations thereafter. In contrast, subjects in the DGEnd treatment had already made their 
donation at this stage, i.e. their remaining budget was smaller: While dictators in DGStart 
calculated with a total of €60, dictators in DGEnd calculated with €60 less the amount they 
had donated. If we take this into account and consider the relative dictator game allocation, 
i.e. the chosen allocation relative to the budget principally available at this stage, we find that 
the differences are decreasing: Dictators in DGStart allocate an average 10% of the available 
budget and dictators in DGEnd allocate 8% on average. Notably, dictators in DGStart allocate 
a larger share of their available budget, although the €40 for participation are not on the table 
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yet. The difference in relative allocations is still significant (Mann Whitney test, 5% 
significance), indicating that the income effect can only partly explain the difference in 
dictator game allocations between DGStart and DGEnd.  
A similar reasoning applies to the donation decision. While subjects in DGStart calculated 
with €60 less their dictator game allocations, individuals in DGEnd calculated with €40 
because they did not know that they would receive an additional €20 after the donation stage. 
Taking this into account, we find that in both treatments subjects donate an average 12% of 
their available budget to the charities. This percentage is not significantly different from the 
relative donations (14%) in the treatment without dictator game (Mann Whitney test). 
Result 2: Relative dictator game allocations are higher when the 
dictator game is played prior to the donation stage. Relative 
donations are not affected by the existence or the time of the dictator 
game. 
 
Individual Patterns 
In the following, we take a closer look at individual patterns and compare individual behavior 
in both tasks. By applying Spearman’s rank correlation test, we observe that in DGEnd 
dictator game allocations and donations are positively and significantly correlated (1% 
significance) while the positive correlation is not statistically significant in the DGStart 
treatment.  
To shed more light on this observation, we define individual behavior as ‘consistent’ if a 
subject belongs to one of three categories: Subject’s giving in both games (i) is zero, (ii) is 
below the respective median values7 but non-zero in at least one decision task, or (iii) is equal 
to or greater than the respective median values. Given this classification, the probability of 
observing consistent behavior across games is significantly higher in DGEnd (75%) than in 
DGStart (63%) (binomial test, 5% significance), as can be seen from Figure 2. 
Figure 2 shows that 5% of the subjects in DGStart give nothing in both decisions while the 
share in the DGEnd treatment is 25%. This difference, however, is almost leveled off by the 
subjects who contribute below the respective median value in both games but give a positive 
amount in at least one decision task. More consistent contributions above the median are 
observed in the DGEnd treatment.  
 9 
Result 3: Individual behavior is more consistent across games if the 
dictator game decision follows the donation decision.  
 
Figure 2: Consistent individual behavior across games 
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Note:  >> - Contribution is above or equal to the respective relative median in both the donation and dictator 
game allocation decision. << - Contribution is below the respective relative median in both the donation and 
dictator game allocation decision, with at least one decision with non-zero contribution. 0 0 - Contribution is 0 in 
both the donation and dictator game allocation decision. 
 
The findings summarized in Results 2 and 3 potentially provide an interesting feature of the 
elicitation of social preferences by means of simple experimental games. Our inexperienced 
subjects who play the dictator game at the beginning of the experiment face a new and 
unfamiliar decision situation. As they probably do not have existing preferences for this 
situation, they construct preferences ad hoc to reach a decision. For example, they may want 
to avoid extreme outcomes and, therefore, allocate a small or medium amount to an 
experimental peer rather than giving nothing. In contrast, if subjects face the dictator game 
decision after the more familiar donation decision, they may use the donation decision as an 
‘anchor’ leading to a higher degree of consistency across games. As this anchor is not 
available when the dictator game is played first, individual behavior is less consistent. This 
result is an indication for how preferences may be constructed in an experiment. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 The median values are calculated in relative terms for each group: (a) relative donations in DGStart, (b) relative 
donations in DGEnd, (c) relative DG allocations in DGStart, (d) relative DG allocations in DGEnd. 
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constructive-preference approach may also explain why charitable donations are stable, i.e. 
independent from the sequence of play, whereas the dictator game allocations are instable. 
 
Econometric Analysis 
In order to gain a further insight into the driving forces behind individuals’ behavior in the 
donation decision and the dictator game, we analyze the impact of various socio-demographic 
variables by conducting an econometric analysis. In both tasks, around one third of the 
participants chooses zero contributions. Hence, there is a large number of observations 
clustered at zero. In this case, ordinary least squares estimates would not be accurate, so we 
use a Tobit estimation model. We include the following socio-demographic variables in our 
regressions: age, household size as the absolute number of household members including 
children, dummy variables for male subjects, unmarried subjects, subjects not having any 
religious affiliation (no religion), voters of the left party8, highly educated subjects 
(education, owning a graduate degree) and high income subjects (monthly net household 
income of €2,000 or more). In order to verify how the sequence of the tasks influences our 
results, we include the dummy variable DGStart which is coded ‘1’ if the dictator game was 
played before the donation stage and ‘0’ if it was played afterwards. In specification (1) in 
Table 3 the dependent variable is the amount donated in the donation decision while in 
specification (2) the dependent variable is the amount allocated in the dictator game. 
Specifications (3) and (4) exclude outliers which are defined as those observations lying 
outside the donation or allocation interval of three standard deviations from the mean.9 
First of all, the estimation results in Table 3 confirm the finding reported in Result 1: People 
choose higher dictator game allocations if they play the dictator game prior to the donation 
stage while donations are not significantly influenced by the order of the tasks. Comparing the 
results of specifications (3) and (4), we see that personal characteristics influence both 
contribution decisions similarly: While neither the donation nor the allocation decision is 
significantly affected by gender, religious affiliation, education, and income, the variables 
age, family status, and voting for the left party have the same directional impact in both 
decision contexts. Older people and unmarried people donate more to the charities and 
allocate more money in the dictator game, whereas voters of the left party donate less and 
                                                 
8 The party “Die Linke” (German for ‘the left’) is one of the five parties that comprise the Federal Parliament of 
Germany. 
9 More precisely, the cut-off threshold for donations is €22.16; the cut-off threshold for dictator game allocations 
is €12.88.  
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allocate less than all other individuals. The positive effect of individuals’ household size on 
donations and dictator game allocations, however, is significant only for the latter. To sum up, 
the same individual characteristics seem to be crucial for generosity in both tasks, no matter 
whether preferences are constructed ad hoc or already existing. 
 
Table 3: Tobit estimation results 
 Including outliers Excluding outliers 
Variable Charitable donation DG allocation Charitable donation DG allocation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
age 0.253*** 0.159*** 0.229*** 0.138*** 
 (0.082) (0.050) (0.066) (0.044)
male -2.134 -1.624 -1.839 -1.245 
 (1.894) (1.141) (1.523) (0.992)
household size 0.702 1.117 1.131 1.283**
 (1.131) (0.676) (0.902) (0.583)
unmarried 9.132*** 4.538*** 7.873*** 4.780***
 (2.830) (1.693) (2.264) (1.476)
no_religion 1.002 -0.582 -1.166 0.021 
 (2.074) (1.257) (1.684) (1.084)
left_party -8.734** -3.638 -6.770** -3.498*
 (3.944) (2.306) (3.106) (1.981)
education 3.283 -0.315 1.526 0.735 
 (2.107) (1.284) (1.691) (1.126)
income 2.364 1.217 0.744 -0.354 
 (2.271) (1.378) (1.826) (1.231)
DGStart 0.929 2.827** 0.640 2.637***
 (1.900) (1.142) (1.533) (1.002)
Constant -15.368*** -8.274** -12.719*** -8.150*** 
 (5.797) (3.484) (4.619) (3.051)
No. of observations 
LR Chi²             
Pseudo R²           
98 
23.32*** 
0.042 
98 
25.20*** 
0.051 
96 
21.80*** 
0.043 
96 
27.20*** 
0.059 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; levels of significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the discussion whether social preferences measured in the lab are 
predictive of individuals’ behavior in other games or decision contexts. As opposed to the 
assumption of stable preferences, the constructive-preference approach suggests that 
individuals construct their preferences ad hoc if they are confronted with an unfamiliar 
decision situation. We take a closer look at this issue as our inexperienced experimental 
subjects allocate money in a conventional dictator game and make a donation decision. While 
the donation context represents a familiar decision situation where individuals are supposed to 
have existing preferences, the dictator game is a rather unfamiliar decision situation where 
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subjects are likely to construct their preferences ad hoc. We pay special attention to the 
sequence in which both games are played by reversing their order to examine whether 
behavior in one situation is predictive of that in the other. 
The results show that dictator game allocations are significantly higher if this game is played 
at the beginning of experimental sessions as compared to the dictator game played at the end 
of a session. Charitable donations, in comparison, are independent of the sequence of play. 
This more stable pattern may result from existing preferences in the donation context. 
Moreover, we observe a significantly positive correlation between charitable donations and 
dictator game allocations if individuals are confronted with the more familiar donation 
decision situation first. Hence, subjects are more likely to behave consistently generous or 
selfish across games or contexts if they start the experiment with the more familiar decision 
problem. An explanation for this may be that they use the more familiar donation decision as 
an anchor for the subsequent dictator game decision leading to a higher degree of consistency 
across games. As this anchor is not available when the dictator game is played first, individual 
behavior is less consistent. This result is an indication for how preferences may be constructed 
in an experiment. 
The discussion in this paper suggests an important conclusion for the measurement of social 
preferences in lab experiments as our data provide an explanation why some studies succeed 
and some studies fail to find a consistent behavioral pattern between a dictator game and a 
different experimental task. It makes an enormous difference whether subjects in lab 
experiments find themselves in context-rich familiar decision situations or in context-free 
unknown games, like the dictator game. Therefore, it is not so obvious in how far 
spontaneously constructed preferences can be predictive of behavior in other contexts or in 
real-life decision situations. In comparison, social preferences measured in more familiar 
decision contexts seem to have greater predictive power of behavior in other decision 
situations. Thus, experimenters trying to elicit social preferences in the lab might rather 
employ more familiar tasks where preferences exist and need not be constructed. Our 
experiment is in line with previous literature which has shown that the dictator game is 
particularly vulnerable to design changes and therefore not well suited for measuring social 
preferences. By adopting more robust tasks, the measurement of social preferences within 
experiments might be improved. Furthermore, special attention should be paid to the sequence 
of games if these present a new decision situation to the experimental subjects. 
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
Table A1: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Gender Male 
Female 
No answer 
103 
119 
1 
46.19 
53.36 
0.45 
Age 18 – 29 
30 – 44 
45 – 59 
60 – 75  
No answer 
73 
60 
54 
34 
2 
32.74 
26.91 
24.22 
15.25 
0.90 
Family Status Single 
Married 
Divorced 
Widowed 
No answer 
139 
45 
31 
6 
2 
62.33 
20.18 
13.90 
2.69 
0.90 
Children Yes 
No 
34 
189 
15.25 
84.75 
Household 
size 
1 
2 
3 
4 or more 
No answer 
102 
82 
21 
17 
1 
45.74 
36.77 
9.42 
7.62 
0.45 
Education University 
Gymnasium (12 years of education) 
Realschule (10 years of education) 
Hauptschule (9 years of education) 
Other 
No graduation 
88 
58 
35 
23 
17 
2 
39.46 
26.01 
15.70 
10.31 
7.62 
0.90 
Nationality German 
Turkish 
Italian 
Polish 
Other 
No answer 
192 
2 
3 
2 
23 
1 
86.10 
0.90 
1.35 
0.90 
10.31 
0.45 
Household net 
income 
< 1.000 € 
1.000 – 2.000 € 
2.000 – 3.000 € 
3.000 – 4.000 € 
4.000 – 5.000 € 
> 5.000 € 
No Answer 
51 
85 
44 
13 
8 
8 
14 
22.87 
38.12 
19.73 
5.83 
3.59 
3.59 
6.28 
Religion Catholic 
Evangelic 
Muslim 
Other 
No religion 
70 
71 
5 
10 
67 
31.39 
31.84 
2.24 
4.48 
30.04 
Voting 
behavior 
The Christian Democratic / Christian 
Social Union 
The Social Democratic Party 
The Greens 
The Free Democratic Party 
The Left Party 
Other 
Nonvoter 
No answer 
43 
 
49 
42 
25 
17 
9 
17 
21 
19.28 
 
21.97 
18.83 
11.21 
7.62 
4.04 
7.62 
9.42 
   223 100.00  
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Table A2: Charitable giving habits of participants 
Variable State Frequency abs. Frequency in % 
Donated before Yes 
No 
189 
34 
84.75 
15.25 
Modal charitable 
purpose1 
Child or disabled care 
Emergency aid 
Medical research 
Church and religious purposes 
Environment or animal protection 
Development aid 
General (e.g. Red Cross, 
charitable lotteries) 
Culture 
Politics 
Local welfare services, homeless 
persons, poverty 
No answer (incl. 34 subjects who 
did not donate before) 
46 
12 
13 
11 
32 
39 
20 
 
3 
2 
8 
 
37 
20.63 
5.38 
5.83 
4.93 
14.35 
17.49 
8.97 
 
1.35 
0.90 
3.59 
 
16.59 
Contribution 
receipt received 
Always 
Mostly 
Sometimes 
Never 
No answer (incl. 34 subjects who 
did not donate before) 
60 
36 
42 
49 
36 
26.91 
16.14 
18.83 
21.97 
16.14 
Donated in 2009 Yes 
No 
67 
156 
30.04 
69.96 
  223 100.00 
1) If subjects stated that they had donated before they were asked to which charity they donated most frequently. 
If subjects gave more than one answer the charity named first was included. 
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Figure A1: Proceedings of the experiment 
1. Distribution of instructions 
2. Drawing of ID numbers 
3. Oral presentation of important instruction details 
6. Questionnaire 
5. Collection of donations 
4. Donation decision 
 
 Disabled care 
 Development aid 
 Medical research 
 Animal protection 
Notes: The proceeding above reflects the DGEnd sessions. In the DGStart sessions, the dictator game and the 
questionnaire were conducted before the donation stage. In the NoDG sessions, no dictator game was played.  
7. Dictator game decision 
8. Collection of dictator game allocations 
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Appendix B: Experimental instructions for DGEnd (translated from German) 
 
Welcome! 
Thank you very much for participating in our study analyzing consumer behavior. Enclosed in 
this folder, you find information which you need throughout the study. You may return to 
pages you have already gone through at any time. Please do not look at the pages behind  the 
next “stop-sign”. You will be asked to turn to the next page. Please only read the respective 
text and do not act until you receive specific instructions to follow the assignment.  
Please follow the instructions carefully. We also would like to ask you not to talk to other 
participants.  
We want to emphasize that all information which we gain from today’s event will only be 
used to draw a comparison between the groups of participants. No individual data about the 
participants will be published or passed on.  
Shortly, we will come up to your seat and you will draw a piece of paper with a number on it. 
This number will serve as your personal identification number (ID) throughout the study. 
Please state your ID whenever you are asked to do so during the study. The ID ensures 
anonymity, as neither other participants nor we know your name or the ID that belongs to it. 
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Part 1  
You will receive 40 Euros for your participation in the study. Shortly, we will hand out the 
money in an envelope. Then we ask you to confirm the receipt. Afterwards, you will get the 
opportunity to donate any preferred amount of money to a charitable cause. 
There is a charitable organization behind every charitable cause. The money you donate if you 
decide to donate any will be completely transferred to the respective charity. We guarantee 
that this will happen lawfully and will have the transfer supervised and verified by the director 
of the notary’s office, […]. 
All selected charitable organizations hold the “donation seal” by the state-approved German 
Central Institute for Social Issues (Deutsches Zentralinstitut für soziale Fragen (DZI)). This 
assures that the organizations act autonomously and charitably and that the usage of their 
financial means is reviewable, economical and statutory. The names of the individual 
organizations will at this point – for scientific reasons – not be mentioned. We guarantee that 
all information you receive from us regarding the organizations is true. At the end of the 
experiment, we are happy to hand to you a list of all organizations upon request.  
In the following, we present to you four different charitable causes to which you can donate in 
the course of this study.  
The four charitable causes are: 
 Medical research 
 Animal protection 
 Disabled care 
 Development aid  
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 We now hand out to you an envelope with the money you receive for your participation in our 
study. 
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
In the envelope, you find:  
- one white envelope 
- one blue envelope  
- 40 Euros, composed of two 10 Euro-bills, one 5 Euro-bill, six 2 Euro-
coins and three 1 Euro-coins   
- one receipt.  
We now ask you to sign the enclosed receipt. By doing so, you confirm that you have 
received 40 Euros from ZEW for the participation in this study. We need the receipt for 
administrative purposes. Without a receipt we are not allowed to give you the money. Your 
data is still handled confidentially and anonymously. We will now collect the receipts. The 
study will continue hereafter.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Now you can make a donation decision. You can decide freely and anonymously whether 
and how much money you want to give to one of the above-mentioned charitable 
organizations. The amount of money you put in the blue envelope will benefit a charitable 
cause and will be transferred completely to the respective charity after the experiment. You 
can keep the amount of money you put in the white envelope. 
 
The study proceeds as follows: 
1.) Make your donation decision. 
In case of a donation, please tick the desired charitable organization on the blue envelope. 
Please note that you have to choose one of the four given charities. It is not possible to choose 
more than one charitable organization for your donation. Please tick only one organization if 
you wish to donate. If you tick more than one organization, unfortunately, we will not be able 
to transfer the donation. If you do not wish to donate, please do not tick any organization.  
2.) Write down your ID-number in the predefined box on the blue envelope, irrespective of 
whether you wish to donate or not.  
3.) Put the desired donation amount in the blue envelope.  
4.) Put the amount of money you wish to keep in the white envelope.  
Finally, you should have distributed 40 Euros completely to the two envelopes. Please note 
that any distribution in full amounts of Euros is possible. You may put any desired amount of 
money into both envelopes. It is also possible to put 40 Euros completely into one envelope.  
5.) Seal up both envelopes.  
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 When all participants have finished, we will come up to you and collect the blue envelope. 
When we do so, please put the blue envelope into the box. Please keep the white envelope. 
We guarantee that your donation will be transferred to the charitable organization lawfully 
and have the transfer supervised and verified by the director of the notary’s office, […].  
We will explain the most important items once again orally. Afterwards, please make your 
decision as described above.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Part 2 – Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions by ticking or filling out.  
If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come up to you and answer your 
question. Please do not say your question out loud and please do not talk to other participants. 
 
1. What is your ID-number?    __________ 
 
2. How can your marital status be described? 
O unmarried 
O married 
O divorced 
O widowed 
 
3. Please state your gender: 
O male  
O female 
 
4. What is your year of birth?   __________ 
 
5. How many people, including you, live in your household?    
       __________ 
 
6. How many children live in your household? 
O 0-3 years old    __________ 
O 4-7 years old    __________ 
O 8-12 years old    __________ 
O 13-18 years old   __________ 
O older than 18 years   __________ 
O none     
 
7. What is your religious affiliation? 
O Catholic 
O Protestant 
O Muslim 
O Jewish 
O Buddhist 
O other:     __________ 
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O no religion 
 
8. What is your highest educational achievement? 
O University/College 
O higher education entrance qualification 
O middle school 
O secondary modern school 
O other:     __________ 
O none 
 
9. What is your original nationality?  
O German 
O Turkish 
O Italian 
O Polish  
O other:     __________ 
 
10. What is your first language?   __________ 
 
11. What are the monthly net earnings of your household (how much money per month is 
available for your household altogether?) 
O below 1,000 Euros 
O 1,000 – 2,000 Euros 
O 2,000 – 3,000 Euros 
O 3,000 – 4,000 Euros 
O 4,000 – 5,000 Euros 
O above 5,000 Euros 
O not specified 
 
12. Which party would you vote for if there were federal elections this Sunday?  
O CDU/CSU 
O SPD 
O Bündnis 90 / The Green Party 
O FDP 
O The Left 
O Other 
O I do not vote 
O not specified 
 
14. Have you made a donation to a charitable organization before?  
O yes  O no 
 
15. To which purpose have you donated most often?  
____________________ 
 
16. Have you already donated to a charitable organization this year? 
 O yes  O no 
 
17. If you answered question 16 with “yes”, in which month have you donated last?  
 ____________________ 
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18. If you answered question 16 with “yes”, how much have you donated this year altogether?  
 _____________________ € 
 
19. Have you ever received a donation receipt for your donation?  
 O always 
 O mostly 
 O occasionally 
 O never 
 
20. Compared with how others live in Germany: Do you think you get your fair share, more 
than your fair share, somewhat less or very much less than your fair share? 
 O fair share 
 O more than fair share 
 O somewhat less than fair share 
 O very much less than fair share 
 O don’t know 
 
21. On the whole, I find the social differences in our country just.  
 O Completely agree. 
 O Tend to agree. 
 O Tend to disagree. 
 O Completely disagree.  
 O Don’t know 
 
22. The State must ensure that people can live a decent income even in illness, hardship, 
unemployment and old age.   
 O Completely agree. 
 O Tend to agree. 
 O Tend to disagree. 
 O Completely disagree.  
 O Don’t know 
 
23. It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between 
people with high incomes and those with low incomes.  
 O Agree strongly.  
 O Agree. 
 O Neither agree nor disagree. 
 O Disagree. 
 O Disagree strongly. 
 O Can’t choose.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 3 
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The participants of our study can be divided into two groups of equal size, which we call 
group A and group B. All participants who join the same session will be randomly assigned to 
one of the groups.   
Participants in group A will shortly receive a further envelope which contains 20 Euros. The 
participants receive these 20 Euros in addition to the 40 Euros which participants of both 
groups receive. Participants in group B will receive no additional money.  
Each participant in group A has the chance to give any desired amount of their 20 Euros to a 
participant from group B which will be randomly assigned. To this end, the participant in 
group A puts money into an envelope, which will later be given to a participant in group B. At 
no time will the participants in group A know which participants in group B have received 
their envelopes. It also applies that at no time, any participant in group B will know which 
person in group A the envelope is from. The participant in group B will receive the envelope 
even in the case that there is no money in it.  
 
Drawing of the group: 
The session which you participate in has randomly been assigned to group A. Therefore, you 
are a member of group A and receive an additional 20 Euros.  
[The session which you participate in has randomly been assigned to group B. Therefore you 
are a member of group B. We now hand out to you an envelope which comes from a 
randomly selected participant of group A.] 
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
[Group B continues with the option to give general comments on the study. The following 
instructions are received by group A only.] 
In the envelope, you find:  
- one white envelope 
- one yellow envelope  
- 20 Euros, consisting of two 5 Euro-bills, as well as two 2 Euro-coins 
and six 1 Euro-coins 
- one receipt  
We now ask you to sign the receipt you find enclosed. By doing so, you confirm that you 
have received 20 Euros from ZEW. We only need the receipt for administrative purposes. 
Without a receipt we are not allowed to give you the money. Your data is still handled 
confidentially and anonymously. We will now collect the receipts. The study will continue 
hereafter.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
Please distribute the 20 Euros to the white and the yellow envelope. You keep the amount of 
money you put in the white envelope. The amount you put in the yellow envelope will be 
given to a participant in group B, which will later be randomly chosen. This participant will 
receive the envelope at the end of their experiment even if there is no money in it. 
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We guarantee that the transfer of the envelope will be carried out lawfully. 
You make the decision whether and how much of the 20 Euros you want to distribute among 
you and an unknown participant freely and anonymously. 
 
The study will be carried out in the following chronological order: 
 
1.) Put the amount you wish to give to a participant of the experiment in the yellow envelope. 
 
2.) Put the amount of money you wish to keep in the white envelope.  
Finally, you should have distributed the 20 Euros completely to the two envelopes. Please 
note that any distribution in full amounts of Euros is possible. You may put any desired 
amount of money in both envelopes. It is also possible to put 20 Euros completely into one 
envelope. 
 
3.) Write your ID-number in the predefined box on the yellow envelope. 
  
 
4.) Seal up both envelopes.  
 
When all participants have finished, we will come up to you and collect the yellow envelope. 
When we do so, please put the yellow envelope into the box. Please keep the white envelope. 
We will explain the most important items once again orally. Afterwards, please make your 
decision as described above.  
 
-- STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! -- 
 
We would like to ask you to write down general comments regarding our study. You may also 
give reasons for your donation decision. [11 empty lines follow.] 
We would like to thank you for participating in our study and wish you a nice day! Please 
remember to take the white envelopes with you. 
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Appendix C: Invitation letter used for recruitment of participants  
(translated from German) 
 
The following writing was sent to randomly selected households in the municipal area of 
Mannheim. The front page shows the logo of ZEW at the top of the letter, general contact 
information of the project manager and the following text: 
 
Ref.: Invitation to a scientific study on consumer behavior 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim is a non-profit research 
institute in the field of applied economics. At present, ZEW is conducting a study on 
individual consumption decisions. In order to carry out our study, we are looking for 
participants. For this reason, we would like to invite you.  
For your participation in the study, which lasts about 60 minutes, you will receive 40 Euros 
in cash. With the money, you will be able to make consumption decisions during the study. 
The money spent will be subtracted from the 40 Euros you received. If you do not spend any 
money, you will be paid out 40 Euros without deductions. In doing so, your decisions will be 
voluntary and anonymous at all times. Only the ZEW researcher team will know your 
identity. Your statements will be treated with the utmost discretion and according to the Data 
Protection Act.  
Please consider the following requirements for the participation in the study: 
 registration by phone; 
 residence in Mannheim (verification with, for example, your identity card); 
 very good knowledge of the German language;  
 between 18 and 75 years old; 
 arriving on time on the selected date and presenting this letter.  
If you would like to take part in the study and meet the conditions mentioned above, please 
choose one of the dates listed on the next page and register by telephone. The selection of 
participants is carried out according to scientific criteria. The event will be taking place at the 
ZEW. At the end of the event, you will receive 40 Euros in cash minus the amount which you 
have possibly spent for your personal consumption. In case you have any further questions, 
please do not hesitate to call us at 0621/1235-395 from June 29th to July 15th 2009, 4pm to 
6pm. 
We are looking forward to welcome you as participant in our study.  
Yours sincerely, 
Sarah Borgloh (project manager) 
 
The back page offers further information concerning the study: 
 
Registration: 
 27 
 28 
Please call from June 29th to July 15th 2009 (Monday to Friday) between 4pm and 6pm at 
the following number: 0621/1235-395. Please state the date (see below) at which you want to 
participate. Your name will be noted for the registration; however, as explained above, it will 
not be published or given to a third party. Please take note that with the reception of this 
letter, you do not have any claim to participate. The selection of participants will be carried 
out according to scientific criteria.  
 
Dates (day, date, time): 
Sat, July 18th 2009, 9-10am Tue, July 21st 2009, 9-10am  
Sat, July 18th 2009, 11-12am Tue, July 21st 2009, 5-6pm  
Sat, July 18th 2009, 2-3pm Tue, July 21st 2009, 7-8pm  
Mon, July 20th 2009, 9-10am Wed, July 22nd 2009, 9-10am 
Mon, July 20th 2009, 5-6pm Wed, July 22nd 2009, 5-6pm 
Mon, July 20th 2009, 7-8pm      Wed, July 22nd 2009, 7-8pm 
 
It follows a map of the location of ZEW and general information about the ZEW taken from 
the homepage of ZEW, www.zew.de.  
 
